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. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

HE element of responsibility occupies a singular place in all systems of criminal justice. It appears at every stage of their development: sacrificial execution, offhand popular vengeance, patriarchal paternal power, private self-help, magisterial discipline, or the advanced stage of legislative justice., Criminal responsibility is concerned
with a problem of artificial rather than causal relevance, and need not be
based upon the intent of the "cul-prit. '2 Thus, "a person is held responsible when the enlightened public opinion of his age and country demands
that he shall be made to suffer in return for pain that he has inflicted." 3
Generally we speak of a "development" or "evolution" of the criminal
law from the collective (vicarious) responsibility of the primitive community and clan to the individual responsibility of a few, selected (or
"found out") with the aid of ever more modernized tools of criminal science or criminology. Collective responsibility may entail destruction of
the whole family of the offender, or the retaliatory measures of the primi* This paper constitutes the brief summary of a doctoral dissertation which bears the same
title and was completed at theUniversity of Chicago, under the direction of Professor Quincy
Wright, in the summer of x944. The author wishes to acknowledge a great indebtedness to
Professor Wright for his counsel and guidance both in the dissertation project and in the
studies which preceded it.
t Sometime Fellow in International Relations, University of Chicago; Assistant Commercial Policy Analyst, United States Tariff Commission, Washington. The views expressed
in the present study are solely those of the author.
I Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America 56 (I9O3).
2 It will be recalled that the word "culprit" originated from the crown's reply to the "not
guilty"-plea of the indicted, the abbreviated Latin cid. pri. for the English equivalent "ready
to prove guilty." Kinney, Law Dictionary and Glossary 213 (1893).
3 Charles Mercier, Criminal Responsibility 4o-41 (z935).
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tive blood feud. Retaliation may also become more specific in the form of
a lex talionis, or again the last shred of humanity might be torn away in
the practices of southeastern Asian head-hunting tribes. At this early
stage, the failure to distinguish between accident and design is almost inevitable. But in a more advanced period, e.g., Deuteronomy, appoints a
city of refuge for the killer by accident, the code of Hammurabi permits
him to escape capital punishment by the murder fine, and Germanic law
4
substitutes the wer for the blood feud in cases of unintentional homicide.
Religious beliefs play a very direct role in humanizing the process of
criminal law. From the theory of witchcraft and possession which prevails
among the savages, there leads a path to the punishment of animals and
inanimate objects, to modified forms of personal vengeance, and to the
utilization of punishment for the protection and promotion of social relationships. Faith in ultimate religious sanctions also permits the eventual
adoption of the principle of composition, the common pecuniary liability
mentioned above.
It has been observed that "developed" primitive legal systems seemed
to consist mainly of "civil law." s One would be equally justified in stating,
however, that all primitive legal systems consist of both "civil" and "criminal law" and that whatever civil law comes to exist originated from the
early criminal law. What we are accustomed to call "civil law" today prevails over primitive criminal law as soon as pecuniary fines and restitution
are introduced. Henceforth criminal law is, so to speak, contained in the
civil law until such time as the two are separated, at first imperfectly,
later (as only the western European systems achieved it since the Renaissance) perfectly. Predominance of the civil law over the primitive criminal
law coincides with the assumption by communal heads and agents of the
authority to mete out punishment. The extent to which private vengeance
and (centrally) "unauthorized" violence are thus eliminated, determines
the cultural progress and maturity in organization of the community concerned.
But numerous writers have pointed out that "the principle of collective
responsibility [first encountered in the early criminal law] does not necessarily disappear with the rise of public justice under central authority. It
lingers on, partly through sheer conservatism, but also in many cases for
political reasons, to a later date."'6 In fact, in one department of all de4 Cherry, "Evolution of Criminal Law," in Kocourek and Wigmore, eds., Evolution of Law
vol. II: Primitive and Ancient Legal Institutions 138-44 passim (1915).
s Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society 58 (1926).
6 Cherry, op. cit., p. x43.
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veloped legal systems, namely that of public and international law, it is
never abandoned. The corporate responsibility of civil law relates to the
collective responsibility stage of the pecuniary fine rather than to the more
primitive one of the blood feud. Collective responsibility of the latter kind
is employed, however, in warfare permitted by international law.
While primitive criminal law is naught but unadulterated vengeance
and "penal law" the body of rules imposing various forms of composition
of the injuries as penalties, developed ("real") criminal law has two different characteristics: it deals only with individual natural persons; and it
7
involves an element of public condemnation in the specification of crimina.
The superstitious Greek connection between a primitive idea of sin and
an indiscriminate array of wrongs was overcome by the late Roman republic and empire. A great Roman achievement was the better classification of offenses. But since severe wrongs continued to be repressed politically, either by some quasi-judicial process or proscriptions, no neat doctrine of individual responsibility was required. And as regards the classical
privata,delicta, an individual criminal responsibility could not be distinguished (if it was at all meant to exist) in the civil law.
Along with the archaic notion of the Greeks and Romans that the
punishment of crimes belonged to the general assembly of freemen, the
doctrine had grown that responsibility simply meant liability of the wrongdoer to the vengeance of his fellows. The Church, on the other hand, fell
heir to the tradition of Stoicism, in which many inarticulate religious and
ethical elements had been preserved from earlier periods. Ecclesiastic
lawyers were therefore the first to introduce into criminal responsibility
the idea of need for expiation of a sin committed against the commandments of God. After deepening the doctrine of criminal responsibility in the
provinces of the Roman empire, the Church influence made itself felt
among the Franks soon after Clovis' espousal of Christianity in 496, and
in due time also reached England. In what was later to become the sphere
of criminal law, the worldy legal and the ethical-moral were well on their
way to a complete fusion.
The early Church had taught that states became necessary and were instituted as a result of the Fall. But now the ecclesiastic-political doctrine
began to be developed that the state was a divine institution, and this was
7 The ends of criminal law can only be served by inflicting upon a guilty individual either
exemplary or remediative punishment, or both. Whatever is chosen, and however guilt is determined, the subject must always be a natural person.
As for "crimina," it should be noted that the term does not refer to "crimes," but to
"accusations." Cf. i Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 24 (1883); Mommsen,
Riimisches Strafrecht 9 if. (i899).
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confirmed in practice by the coronation and consecration of the emperor
through the pontiff. The statements of Paul in the New Testament concerning the Roman magistrates were replaced by references to the Old
Testament where it spoke of the anointing of David. But the Church was
unable to lend reality for long to the myth of a continued Roman empire
of the world. If this had at any time been part of some definitely conceived
policy, it was soon opposed by the fragmentary break-up of European
society.
The limitations of locally administered justice led to a new development
of the poenae naturales. These were not very different from the earlier
concepts of Antiphon and Hippias and of Roman legal doctrine, and ecclesiastic authorities were not disposed to discourage even superstitious
belief in such sanctions. On the other hand, the world-wide Church developed a more formal and unified canon law, from the Decretum Gratiani
about i i4o to the papal decretals of Gregory IX (1234) and his successors,
which possessed an elaborate penal law of its own. By the time of Innocent
IV, the canonists had advanced the consistency and influence of their
criminal rules sufficiently so that the Church could challenge the contradictory statements of the glossators.
Near the end of the thirteenth century, the advisory function of the
Church in criminal matters had become indispensable everywhere. Where
secular authorities alone were concerned with a wrong, they were eloquent
on the divine ordination of their judicial office, they utilized the canonic
methods of investigation and absorbed the ecclesiastic terminology into
the vernacular language of the forum. When Boniface VIII, in 1302, put
forward his claim to judicial omnipotence, the Holy See indeed possessed
the better tools to rule. Sovereigns had a confused worldly law to work
with, and could no longer represent, let alone defend, their miestas without ecclesiastic support. In the realm of criminal law, the Church alone
could determine the "evilness" of a wrong; the sovereign and his agents
were mere deputies of the Church or the executors of the clerical judicial
decisions. The only quarter which could effectively demonstrate its opposition to the papal claims was the quickly consolidating French state.
Philip IV (the Fair) asserted the superiority of national-secular royal
power over the (appelate) judicial power of the pontiff.
The universal influence of the Church during the early Middle Ages
had rested on the absence of a regular state, the substitute ideal of a world
empire based on faith, and the simplicity of social and economic conditions.
Eventually, the rise of a number of national states and the growth of social
relationships which were more than a match for ecclesiastic controls
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brought about the crisis for the medieval Church. National lay influence
made itself felt in the ecclesiae, and sects were formed. Then the princes
concluded concordats with the Holy See and divided the ecclesiastic power
in their domain with the pope. The Church widened the scope of lay activities in. its organization, and it developed the doctrine of the poor arld only
spiritual church. But its centralization in the papacy and the conclusion
of the concordats enhanced the growth of national states.
Despite the decline of the pervasive judicial power of the pope, wrongs
continued to be considered "crimes" when the late medieval Romancanon law deemed them to be "sins." The theological doctrine of "sin,"
specifically in the form adopted by the canon law, had originally formed
the matrix for the development of what ultimately became the modern
criminal responsibility of individuals.8 In the sixteenth century, the formulation of this doctrine reached a significant stage, heralded by the resolutions of the Council of Trent. The principal points at issue may be mentioned briefly.
Pelagius (ca. 360-42o) had insisted on the fact of the moral responsibility of the individual. To uphold this truth, he showed each sinful act to
be a separate and isolated occurrence without peculiar effect upon the
character of the doer. Pelagius denied the existence of sinful habit, and
pictured the nature of individual responsibility as the power and obligation of every man to do right on all occasions. Unqualified free will and
the possibility of sinlessness were the.logical results of such reasoning. St.
Augustine (354-430), due to his doctrine of imputation and his confusion
of Original Sin with Original Guilt, was led to disregard voluntary consent
of a person as an essential factor in guilt; he considered all men to be
equally guilty. Augustine allowed, full moral responsibility to Adam; but
he held that all men were potentially in Adam, and, moreover, were Adam
when he sinned!
The waywardness of Augustine's philosophy was corrected partly by
the semi-Pelagian school, initiated by the Gallican monks (chiefly Johannes Ermitia Cassianus [?36o-?435] of Massilia) and the clergy of Southern
Gaul early in the fifth century. The semi-Pelagians recognized the full
moral responsibility of the individual; each man is condemned by his conscience for every sin as if it were his sole creation. But according to this
view, man did not possess the power to do right and abstain from sin uns "Sin" occupied exactly the place of the modem cidpa ("guilt") in the technical criminal
law, although nowadays the content of the term has been changed from a moral-ethical to a
social-psychological one. Cf. 2 Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 1o57, note (5th ed., x885).
J. Grimm even connected the German SiInde with culpa. Cf. i Mller, The Christian Doctrine
of Sin 89, n. 3 (trans. from 5th German ed. by William Urwick, 1868).
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der all circumstances and regardless of his previous history. Moral responsibility was taken to mean rather the power to desire and to endeavor
to do right, however unsuccessful the attempt might turn out.
St. Thomas Aquinas (i225-74) in the main espoused Augustinianism.

But since he had "to find a niche for Aristotle in the temple of God," 9
Aquinas admitted natural virtues even in the heathen, and tended toward
a more liberal view of human nature in general. Throughout the Middle
Ages the restlessness and dissatisfaction with Augustine's severe principles
continued, and a strong current of opinion favored semi-Pelagianism.
While the well-nigh semi-Pelagian canons, issued by the Council of Trent
in 1546,"o finally emerged as the guiding light of the Counter-Reformation,
the Protestants returned to the Augustinian anthropology. Both Lutherans and Calvinists imputed such complete depravity to human nature
that man could not but be inclined to evil; in their pronouncements it almost appeared as if "since the Fall the image of God is wholly obliterated
in mankind.""r It remained reserved to the emancipators of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to resolve "sin" into mere illusion and unreality, or to trace it to the will of man. Nevertheless, Spinoza
(Baruch d'Espinosa, 1632-77) attacked the nature of evil from a purely
metaphysical point of view almost a century before, and realist jurists at
least equivocated or ignored, if they did not resolve, the problem of sin.
From his interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, Luther had derived serious misgivings as to the permissibility of all jurisprudence. He
calmed his fears with the argument that all human administration of justice was a necessary consequence of the Original Sin, and he merely demanded that the law be popular and intelligible. Calvin, trained jurist
that he was, appreciated man-made law as an essential contribution to
the governance of society according to Christian principles. Althusius
evinced a singular appreciation of the ancientratio scripta,and Melanchton
almost identified the Roman law with the Decalogue. But the reintroduction of classical Roman law into the legal and political sciences of the Continent was accomplished by single Calvinist humanists, rather than by the
Protestant spirit as such.
At a time when Protestantism still adhered to the traditional ecclesias9 Moxon, The Doctrine of Sin 137 (1922).
statement applies more to the effect of the Tridentine canons in question than to
the actual wording. Likewise, it can only be made concerning the treatment of free will by the
council. As soon as the element of grace is mentioned, in others of the Tridentine canons, the
views of St. Anselm, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas unquestionably reappear. Cf. The Catholic
Encyclopaedia vol. XI, pp. 312-15 (i91I).
"Moxon, op. cit., p. 167.
10 This
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tic "natural law," the jurists developed a political "natural law" with their
newly found classical tools. In the exact sciences, the discoveries of Copernicus (1473-i543), Kepler (1571-1630), Galileo (1564-1642), and Newton
(1643-1727) taught the human mind to tread its own paths without the

guiding hand of the Church. The law of causality held great appeal for the
jurists and political philosophers who had become enamored with the
rational elements of the Roman law; in the latter frame of reference it appeared applicable to societal relationships as well. The law of causality
was therefore accepted as the all-embracing foundation of a new Weltanschauung. And when, during the Enlightenment, the distinction between
community and individual came to be further clarified, the new learning
was prominently reflected in the penology of Montesquieu, Beccaria,
Bentham, and Feuerbach.
II. INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

Since the fall of the Roman empire, juristic thought has alternated between the concept of a positive world law binding all men, as set forth
most clearly by Gaius, but also by Ulpianus, and the concept of an international law binding only states as corporate entities. Both of these concepts, in Latin usage, came to be termed ius gentium. Moreover, both could
be said to possess a natural-law basis. But the world-law concept (of
Gaius and others) aimed at an organized societashominum, and the almost
exclusive and far-reaching employment of individual responsibility by this
school was primarily designed to that end. Corporate-responsibility doctrines ultimately came to prevail, by and large, in the classical international law. In the following we shall characterize certain traits and tendencies
in these developments.
Sovereigns and their agents had always enjoyed a large measure of immunity from the ordinary penal process. A certain tradition of individual
responsibility, however, also developed in the public and international
affairs of the western world. As reatusmaiestatis,Henry the Lion was subjected to a feudal-penal process in ii8o, which incidentally broke the
power of the Guelfs and enabled the Staufer to orient German policy
toward Italian enterprises. John Lackland was subjected not only to the
feudal trial of 1202, but in all probability also to an in contumaciam conviction under the strict French penal law less than a decade later. It appears that Philip Augustus, King of France, wished to stamp John a common criminal (for the murder of Arthur) in order to ease French acquisition of British territory exheridatione.
On November 11, 12o8, the Guelf Otto IV presided over the trial of
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Otto von Wittelsbach who had assassinated the Staufer king, Philip of
Suabia, the preceding June 21. Conradin, Duke of Suabia and last of the
Staufer, was beheaded on October 29, 1268. His case, however, presents a
special problem under the laws of war, namely whether an enemy leader,
who has been made a prisoner of war, can be legally put to death." Conradin had suffered defeat at the hands of Charles of Anjou near Tagliacozzo. On April 13, 1313, the Emperor caused Robert of Anjou, King of

NAples, to be convicted contumaciously as a traitor, but the sentence ultimately was vacated by Pope Clement V on March 14, 1314. The pro-

ceedings against Joan of Naples in the fourteenth century, under accusation of complicity in the murder of her husband Andrew, King of Hungary,
were discontinued not long after their initiation.
Mary Queen of Scots was cited before the Royal Commission appointed
on October 5, 1586, by Queen Elizabeth, and accused as an accessory to
Anthony Babington's plot. The Stuart queen appealed to her rights under
the law of nations: Parin parem potestatem non habet. Charles I, in January 1649, resolutely objected to the jurisdiction of the special High Court
of Justice which the British Parliament had created for his trial. At the
conclusion of its summary proceedings this tribunal found, however, that
the king could be condemned to death "....

By the Fundamental law

of this kingdom, by the general law of all nations, and the'unanimous
. 3
consent of all rational men in the world .
Among numerous instances of judicial and summary proceedings
against authorized agents of the sovereign or the state, one might mention
'the impeachment of William, Earl of Portland, in Great Britain, on April
i, 1701, for "concluding the Treaty of Partition, which was .... dangerous to the peace of Europe." 14 On April 14, 1701, the Commons instituted

similar proceedings against John, Lord Sommers, Edward, Earl of Orford,
and Charles, Lord Halifax, for advising the Treaty of Partition. Lord
Sommers was tried by the Lords on June 17, 1701, in Westminster Hall;

the charges against him as well as the other accused ultimately were dismissed. The spectacle was repeated when Oxford and Bolingbroke signed
the Treaty of Utrecht.
2Nys, The Trial of Mary Queen of Scots from the Point of View of Public International
Law, 17 Jurid. Rev. 5o (i9o5).
13"A perfect NARRATivE of the whole PROCEEDINGS of the HIGH CoURT OF JusTIcE, in
the Trial of the KNG, in Westminster-Hall. With the several Speeches of the King, Lord
President, and Solicitor General. Published by Authority, to prevent false and impertinent
Relations-January 20-27. A.D. 1649. Licensed by Gilbertlabbot," in 4Howell, State Trials,
c. 993, at c. 1032.
14Hatsell's Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons, vol. IV, Relating to Conference and Impeachment, p. 255 (1818).'

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS
Yet it appears that the doctrine of corporate responsibility was equally
well founded in theory and practice. While the Romans internally, also
in matters of state, regarded their body politic as a Gesamivielheit (or as a
corporate entity only for civil proceedings), they enforced corporate
(penal) responsibility in their foreign relations. Carthage, as Troy with
the Greeks before, was considered and dealt with as a Gesamtheit.
The glossators supported the punishment of universitates.But, as can be
seen, e.g., from the retribution which was meted out by imperial order
for the murder of Bishop Adalbert of Mainz and his companions in 1158, in
reality only a few leading actors in the crime were punished by death and
the remainder fined. Following the doctrine of Johannes Teutonicus (d. ca.
1220) in the Glossa ordinaria to the Decretum, Innocent IV taught Impossibile est quod universitas delinquat. Thus, Ad providam, issued by
Clement V under the compulsion of Philip the Fair, abolished the Templars "not by judicial sentence,... but by way of an administrative order
given in virtue of the fulness of papal authority."' s Bartolus of Saxoferrato
(1314-57) again believed that corporations could commit wrongs and
be punished therefor. Among political theorists, "Ockham even went so
far as to transfer the lore of corporate delict to the relation between Political Communities and that State which comprises all Mankind, in such
wise that by a formal sentence of the Corporation of All Mortal Men (universilas mortalium) a guilty Nation might be deprived of any preeminence
that it had enjoyed and indeed of all part and lot in the rulership of the
World-Community."' 6
In practice, however, corporate responsibility resulted either in general
pecuniary fines and the dissolution of the universitas or in the vicarious
capital punishment of individuals. Churchmen like Innocent IV had objected, e.g., to the excommunication of corporate bodies because it would
jeopardize the future welfare (in this world and particularly in the next)
of the innocent members without justice. A profane lawyer, Johannes
Oldendorp (148o-1567), attempted to reconcile the teachings of the canonists (decretists and decretalists) with those of the glossators and postglossators. He found that an universitas could not be distinguished from
its individual members materialiter,but that it did differforma et ordinatio:
denial of this fact would overthrow all civil society. Yet, although he was
unable to counter the dictum of Innocent, he held that a community could
be held responsible for "omissive wrongs" (non-restraint of agents) and
"indirect delicts" (arson, plunder).

Is As quoted in O'Sullivan and Bums, Mediaeval Europe 6x6

(I943).

x6Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. F. W. Maitland, 64 (19oo).
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III. DOCTRINES OF CLASSICAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

The rules which Francisco de Vitoria (148o-i546) initiated, when rising

nation-states made the formal arrangement of international relations a necessity, were developed from extant customs, humanitarian recommendations, and purported jural analogies. The responsibility doctrines of international law were primarily designed to decrease the violence, and
eventually to bring about the total abolition, of warfare. Victoria supported the punishment of an enemy even after his defeat in battle and
beyond the needs of mere self-defense. But this left aggressors and depraved rulers to be restrained only by acts of high policy as permitted by
the fortunes of war.
Balthazar Ayala (1548-84) recommended that the pope be recognized
as supreme judge for instances where sovereigns violated the law of nations or resorted to indefensible cruelties in the conduct of their (perhaps
initially lawful) military campaigns. Ayala opposed municipal punishment of war criminals: if it did not lead to the unwarranted exculpation of
the guilty ones, it could prove subversive to the general order of the state.
But just as the Spanish judge advocate opposed the idea of a people trying
its own sovereign, he did not deem the enemy qualified to conduct the
requisite proceedings after his victory. The power relationship which
Ayala proposed in his system could have had important repercussions upon
the international order, the pope possessing not only a more or less administrative function (comparable to the modem League of Nations and the
courts connected with its system), but also a very real judicial one. Since
Ayala relied on a strong international procedure and somehow on real
judicial proceedings for rulers and high military leaders (the very point in
which he was later opposed by Vattel)., he could afford to admit the plea
of superior orders for the benefit of ordinary soldiers.
Alberico Gentili (1552-i6o8), learned civilian and steeped in the doc-

trines of Bartolus, held that war could be made as "punishment" for
"cases in which a sovereign or a nation does wrong."'' 7 A sovereign, by any
(official?) act, eo ipso binds his state which, in its entirety, is subject to
punishment ("according to the law of nations") for the wrong of the ruler.
And the same applies "to instances in which a private individual has done
wrong and his sovereign or nation has failed to atone for [note: not repairl]
his fault."' 8
For Hugo Grotius (Huigh de Groot, 1563-1645), as for Gentili, war
17 De Jure Bell Libri Tres, z, XXI (1598), Carnegie Endowment: Classics of International
Law, vol. H, Trans. by J. C. Rolfe (i935).
x8 Ibid.
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could not only be an instrument for correcting political situations, but also for meting out punishment. But war as a police action and separate
trial of the responsible sovereign could not exist in Grotius' conception.
Responsibility, therefore, did not appear to him as the important element,
which had to be considered in a trial of individuals upon the successful
conclusion of the "just war" (cf. Ayala's proposal, supra). Grotius recognized it only as an incidental factor determining the justice and severity
of a war. As war itself constitutes the punishment, the responsibility of
groups almost eclipses the (original) responsibility of individuals in his
arguments.
Grotius held that most wars were not undertaken for the purpose of
punishment, although even the latter cause had not infrequently been
joined by the desire to make good some loss. He suggested that war as
punishment should not be commenced for trivial causes. Grotius pioneered
in showing the legality of war, not only for the above-mentioned instances
where those, whose interests have been injured, mete out the "retribution," but also for the purpose of humanitarian intervention on behalf of
others. A community and/or its rulers may also be held responsible for the
crime of a subject if they knew of it and took no such preventive measures
as stood in their power to employ. And the same responsibility is incurred
by a community and/or its ruler if they do not abide by the principle aut
dedere aut punire. As Grotius applied the latter rule only to acts which injured mankind at large, he may be said to have laid the groundwork here
for the contemporary exemption of "political offenses" from extradition.
The eminent Dutch jurist frankly avowed that, properly speaking, no
one should be punished for another's wrong; but he was equally ready to
approve certain exceptions. He also stated that the municipal responsibility of a king could only assume a conditional civil character. Visquez
had stated that, "A ruler who maltreats an innocent man by that very
act ceases to be a ruler." But Grotius countered such doctrine with the observation that, "A statement either less true or more dangerous than that,
it would be hard to make."' 9 If the king renounces his governmental authority or has manifestly abandoned it, he is subject to trial just like any
other private person; but he cannot be called to account for deeds committed while he was still acting in an official capacity. And, furthermore,
"He is by no means to be considered as having renounced a thing who is
merely too neglectful of it. ' '2 ° A ruler is punished either by a "just war"
"9De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, 2, I, 9 (2) (1625), Carnegie Endowment: Classics of
International Law, vol. II, trans. by Francis W. Kelsey (1925).
20

Ibid., i, IV,9.
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made upon his domain or by poenae naturales.As for the latter, the infliction of great suffering by the Deity upon a people really affects their ruler
as punishment.
While Richard Zouche (159o-x66o) dealt mainly with the ius in bello,
as far as his writings on international law are concerned, Samuel Pufendorf
(1632-94) furnished comments of a more general nature. The latter
stated: "A punishment can in general be defined 's an evil of suffering
that is inflicted in proportion to the evil of action,' or as some troublesome
evil which is imposed upon a man by way of coercion, and by the authority of the state, in view of some antecedent delict. ' ' 21 Pufendorf, like
Hobbes, regarded the unauthorized crime of the corporation's agent solely
as his own responsibility. But if the agent had received the express approval or instruction of the universitas,Pufendorf declared him as well as
the universitas liable to punishment. The corporate entity can be dissolved and all of its guilty members fined. In matters affecting international relations, however, "criminal responsibility" and liability to punishment could only be enforced through the workings of nature since Pufendoff found that no human courts existed to sit in judgment over princes
and states. Thus, while Pufendorf did not resort to Grotius' proof of the "indirect" punishment of princes, he simply asked all peoples to suffer the
22
aberrations of their rulers, and the consequences, as "a turn of fortune."
Christian Wolff (1679-1754) believed that if a sovereign oppresses his
subjects, foreign rulers possess the right of interceding in behalf of the unfortunates. He recommended that such measures of humanitarian intervention be limited to peaceful actions. When a sovereign or a state injures
the interests, and imperils the security, of another nation, the latter has
the right to self-defense and punishment. The wrong of the sovereign becomes the wrong of the state because in Wolff's system, the sovereign
still is the state. "The act of the ruler of a state as such, by which injury
is caused to outsiders,'the people is bound to assume as its own."23 A "disturber of public security" can be removed, however, by the (military)
action of several other states.
According to Emer de Vattel (1714:-87), "the duty and contract of
civil socieiy oblige it to make all effort not to change its status.' 24 But
21 De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, 8, 111, 4 (1672), Carnegie Endowment: Classics
of International Law, vol. II, trans. by C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather (1934).

Ibid., 8, II, 3o.
23Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractum, V, 6oo (1749), Carnegie Endowment:
Classics of Internationil Law, vol.'II; trans. by J. H. Drake (1934).
24Le Droit des Gens, 1, XVII, 201 (1758), Carnegie Endowment: Classics of International
Law, vol. III, trans. by Charles G. Fenwick (i916).

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS

this is no rigid provision. Ordinarily, sovereigns and states will abide by
the rules which Vattel listed for peaceful international relations. Yet
while no nation has the right to interfere in the government of another and
while no sovereign may make himself judge of the conduct of another,
there exists a right of self-protection and united action against a wrongdoer. Subjects may also resist, and separate themselves from, a sovereign
who violates the fundamental laws. This principle, however, should not be
employed to authorize criminal designs against the peace of nations. Likewise, "It is in violation of the Law of Nations to call on subjects to revolt
when they are actually obeying their sovereign, although complaining of
''
his rule. 2S
Vattel conceded that there were also occasions on which nations need
exercise no restraint as regards the right of self-defense and foreign intervention. A sovereign has the duty to avenge injuries to the state and to
protect his subjects. He should not permit citizens of his state to offend
foreign states or their subjects. Only through express approval of his act
by the wrongdoer's state or sovereign will a wrong be charged to the culprit's ifation. An offensive war for the punishment of a nation must be
founded, "like every other war,' 2 6 upon right (actual injury received and
requirements of sell-defense) and-upon necessity (impossibility of obtaining "just" satisfaction by other means than war). But under no circumstances would Vattel countenance "the dangerous error or the extravagant pretense of those who assume the right to punish a nation for faults
which do not concern them; men, who senselessly setting themselves up as
defenders of the cause of God, undertake to punish the depravity of morals
7
or the irreligious life of a people who are not committed to their care.'
IV. CRIMNAL RESPONSIBLITY AND CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Contemporary international law no longer is the law of sovereigns. It
governs the relations between independent states and prescribes state
responsibility rather than state conduct. 8 International law contains the
rules which individuals must observe lest their states be held liable for
their acts and omissions. To avoid incurring this quasi-civil liability and
exposing themselves to reprisals, governments provide for, respectively
assent to, the enforcement of international law through municipal law.
2S Ibid., 2, IV, .56.
26 Ibid., 3,H-, 41.
271bid.; cf. also 2, VII, 1.
"8Wright, The Enforcement of International Law through Municipal Law in the United
States, University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, voL V, No. 1, p. 12 (1916). Cf.
ibid., pp. 228-29.
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Municipal criminal codes allow the prosecution of individuals whose activities may not directly affect their own state, but might -threaten the
continued good relations with a foreign country. Libel on a foreign sovereign and injury to an ambassador fall into this category. War crimes and
war treason also possess a municipal character. War crimes in the narrow
sense include violations of the recognized rules of warfare, hostilities by
individuals not members of enemy armed forces, espionage and treachery,
and all marauding acts.2 9 These are distinguished from "ordinary" municipal-law crimes, such as murder and theft, because they primarily
serve to enforce norms of international law.3o

"International law crimes" are special grounds of state jurisdiction.
The offense of piracy (iure gentium) has been considered a prototype for
all international law crimes. Its origin is dated from the time when the
"freedom of the seas" was first enunciated as a principle of the law of nations. In order to insure the continued safety of the merchant ships of the
several states and to provide for the effective repression of piratical acts
of depredation on the high seas also in the future, the Family of Nations
adopted at an early date this dignified form of self-help. This type of customary international law has been supplemented by particular and general
conventional international law. Here we find agreements regarding the
protection of submarine cables, the policing of the fisheries of the North
Sea, the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, the control of the traffic
in narcotics, the supervision of the international trade in arms and ammunition and implements of war, the traffic in women and children (white
slavery), the liquor traffic in Africa, the suppression of the circulation of
obscene publications, the suppression of counterfeiting currency and securities, and the suppression of terrorism. Some of the crimes defined in
international conventions have found almost universal enforcement (e.g.,
Article II of the Cables Convention of 1864 in time of peace, and the
Geneva [Red Cross] Conventions of 1864, 19o8, and 1929, during hostilities). Others, such as the "crime of war" under the Briand-Kellogg Pact,
still are innocuous ideals.
There are various forms in which a state may assume jurisdiction, if a
crime has been committed. The territorial principle, "oldest" among the
five principles of jurisdiction, 31 determines jurisdiction by the place where
29 2

Oppenheim, International Law 451 (6th ed.,

1940).

Cf. Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 530, at pp. 555-56
(1943).
31 Cf. Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, Edwin D. Dickinson, Reporter, 29 Am. J. Int. L., Supplement, Part II, pp. 445 ft. (1935).
3o
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the crime was committed, which may include cases where the "gist" of the
offense consists of the harmful act as well as instances where it consists of
the consequence of the act. The nationality principle refers to jurisdiction
over natural persons who are nationals of the state, but also to jurisdiction
over corporations and other juristic persons possessing the national character of that state. Among aliens assimilated to nationals may be found
those who perform a public function for the state or who are part of the
personnel of a ship or aircraft of its flag. If a crime is committed by an
alien against the security, the territorial integrity, or the political independence of a state, yet outside of its territory, the courts of that state
may assume jurisdiction upon the protective principle. Although the
fourth principle, that of universality, has frequently been regarded as the
"piracy principle," the Harvard Draft envisages a larger scope for its application. Jurisdiction on the universality principle is the classical alternative to extradition, and many states have made provision in their municipal codes for its exercise. General acceptance of the universality principle by all states for certain acts would render the application of the muchcriticized passive-personality principle unnecessary. The latter justifies
state jurisdiction solely upon the nationality of the person injured. Prominent Continental writers have denounced this principle as "one of the
' and both the Ameriworst inventions of nationalism in jurisprudence, '32
can Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws and the Harvard Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime have joined in rejecting
it.
It is a rule, as Chief Justice Marshall expressed it in TheAntelope,33 that:
"The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another. ....

,,34

Moreover, no foreign process can be had in criminal cases. This hampers
proceedings on the nationality, protective, and passive-personality principles, and it also shows thateven the universality principle cannot take
the place of a truly international procedure. If the "gist" of the offense
consists of the consequence of the harmful act or omission, the application
of the territorial principle might likewise offer only limited possibilities.
In the absence of letters rogatory in these causes, and due to the predomi3Mendelssohn

Bartholdy, The American Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,

Transactions, Grotius Society, vol. XXI, p. i6i, at z69, n. (i) (z935).
33 io Wheat. (U.S.) 66 (x825).
34 Ibid., at 125. Precedents: Folliott v. Ogden, i H. Bi. 123 (1789), aff'd in Ogden v. Folliott, 3 T.R. 726 (1790); Ogden v. Folliott, 4 Bro. P.C. iii (1792); Wolff v. Oxholm, 6 M.

and S. 92 (1817). "Penal" laws in Marshall's dictum refer to criminal jurisdiction. Cf., inter
alla, Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 13 S. Ct. 224 (1892), and the Privy Council case by
the same parties [1893] A. C. i5o.
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nantly territorial conception of contemporary criminal law, compensation
is sought in the expedient of extradition.
The moral duty of extradition, incumbent upon all states, is usually
fortified by treaties. The latter have gradually changed from the list or
enumeration system (specifying extradition offenses) to the broader
gravity-of-penalty system. Multilateral extradition conventions are a
twentieth-century achievement. "The overwhelming majority of treaties
provide, in substance, that (i) Extradition is, as a rule, limited to offenses
committed outside the territory of the requested State; (2) Extradition
may be granted, under specified conditions, for crimes committed within
the territory of third States."I s The evidence submitted together with the
request for extradition should be such as to establish a prima facie case
against the accused. American extradition practice considers in contumaciam convictions of foreign countries irrelevant; in such cases, the requested person is regarded as charged with, not convicted of, the offense.
Upon extradition, a person should be prosecuted only for the specific
offense for which his surrender was asked of the asylum state.
The exclusion of so-called political offenses from the category of extraditable crimes plays an important, if most controversial, role in contemporary international relations. "Treasons, then," Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson wrote to Messrs. Carmichael and Short in 1792, "taking the
simulated with the real, are sufficiently punished by exile." 36 After the
Concert of Europe had.virtually abolished the political-offense exemptions
in 1833, Belgium specially inserted a liberal provision recognizing these in
her extradition legislation and in the treaty with France of 1834. Forty-six
treaties signed during the following thirty years contained similar articles
as the Franco-Belgian agreement.37 In 1856, the Belgian law was modified,
however, by the "attentat clause." This provision stated that an attempt
against,the life of the head of a government or against that of any member
of his family, when such an attempt "comprises the act either of murder
or assassination, or of poisoning, shall not be considered a political offence
or an act connected with such an offence." 35 Most of the extradition
treaties subsequently concluded contain a similar reservation in one form
or another, whenever reference is made to political offenses. The Finnish
35Harvard Draft Convention on Extradition, Charles K. Burdick, Reporter, 29 Am. J. Int.
L., Supplement, Part I, p. 91 (1935).
1 36 From a statement dated March 22, 1792. Am. State Papers For. Rels. 258; 4 Moore,
Digest of International Law 332 (r9o6).
7Mander,

Foundations of Modern World Society 96 (1941).

"sAs quoted ibid.
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law of 1922 permits extradition of any political offender whose crime involved particular cruelty. As some crimes possess a mixed political and
common ("evolutive" or "anterograde" and "retrograde") character,
Switzerland, a traditional haven of European political refugees, first
adopted the principle of "predominance" in 1892. Hereunder, proof that
his crime entailed predominantly political elements rests with the accused
individual.
V. WAR CRIMES, TE CRIME OF WAR, AND AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

Some progress has been achieved in the unification of criminal codes and
the international standardization of criminal procedure for safeguarding
the peace and welfare of nations. Concrete proposals have also been
drafted looking toward the establishment of a direct supranational procedure which can deal with the most dangerous "political crimes," with
the "crime of war," and with certain violations of the laws of warfare. A
good deal of this preparatory work will be put to the test when the war
criminals of the present conflict are punished. According to the Moscow
Declaration on German Atrocities, issued on November i, 1943, most of
the culprits "will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged
on the spot by the people whom they have outraged." Separate provision
is being made, however, for dealing with "the case of the major criminals,
whose offenses have no particular geographical localization."' 9 There is
strong sentiment now that the latter proceedings be not only of a judicial
character, but also that they take place in the permanent forum envisaged
by Ayala (1582),40 Tsar Nicolas I (I818), Bismarck (187o, ad hoc?), the
Dutch government in 1920 (saving clause in the reply to the first Allied
request for the surrender of the ex-Kaiser), and the late Dr. James Brown
Scott (1921).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Part of the quest for a better world order is the enforcement of adequate individual responsibility under criminal law for the protection of
mankind in general. This is a problem which concerns both substantive
law and procedure. The well-known Austinian dilemma regarding international law may be resolved by defining the latter as "the science dealing
with the area of agreement of the foreign policies (iurafecialia) of all
civilized states." (lus ad bellum as well as ius in bello would be included
of State Bulletin, vol. IX, p. 3o, at 311 (1943).
The worldly nature of contemporary international institutions does not derogate from the
essence of Ayala's proposal, but it eliminates the objections of Vattel.
39Department
40
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here because in time of war much of the diplomacy of a state is replaced
by the rules and practices of warfare.) International law is, therefore, a
coordinating discipline. Now, already the Roman ius publicum had much
in common with Roman foreign policy as reflected'in the iusfeciale. Even
today sovereigns and other representative agents of the state enjoy many
of the exemptions in municipal public and administrative law, which they
find as privileges and immunities in international law. These considerations lead to the recognition of the "administrative-political" character of
international law. One could almost speak of ius publicum as "internal administrative law" and of ius feciale as "external administrative law" of a
state. Our principal shortcomings lie in the failure to discern that "administrative law" (the "external" conniving with the "internal") has
limited the "judicial law" excessively. What remains to be shown in another study as "the most judicial law"-namely, criminal law-cannot be
enforced on a sufficient scale at present without distinction of the culprit's station-regardless of the harm suffered by humanity at large.4x
The distinction between ius publicum and ius privatum (Gaius), gubernaculum and jurisdictio (Bracton), (regimen) regale and pollticum (Fortescue)-between the administrative-political and the judicial function-is
nothing new. It has recently been recalled for the constitution of municipal systems, 42 and applies equally well to the realm of international organization where gubernaculum presently blots out jurisdictio. Nothing can
make this clearer than the responsibility doctrines which still prevail in
international law. Ideology and political preference play an important
role in all phases of the "administrative-political law." In international
law they have a far-reaching effect.
The "functionalists" have done much of late to emphasize the ideological, political, and social data to which (the administrative) international
law should be adapted. But their arguments are still vitiated by some misleading analogies (e.g., private law) and by occasional confusions of "administrative" and "judicial" law (e.g., the alleged primitivity of international law). The customary distinction between municipal law and international law is useful when one has to deal with more or less technical
questions of the enforcement of international law through municipal law.
Discussion on this level, however, cannot transcend the narrow limits of
national interest; the potentialities of world organization cannot be appreciated. Further progress in (our branch of) jurisprudence would seem
4' A reassessment of the diplomatic privileges and immunities, inter alia, is here envisaged,
not their abolition.
42 McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modem, esp. p. 149 (1940).
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to depend upon the adoption of a distinction between guberhaculum and
jurisdictio. This may require a re-examination of "ultimate" legal norms
and the classification of all rules of law according to whom they govern, not
according to who administers them. Compare the Permanent Court of International Justice, administering ius quod ad status litigantesspectat, and
a special world court system, dealing with individuals according to ius
quod ad singulorum et societatis hominum utilitatem spectat.
As regards procedural matters, we can frankly recognize that a world
state is unlikely to be organized in the course of the twentieth century.
But international agreements might be concluded for the progressive decrease of the absolute sovereignty of national states. At present, the Conflict of Laws disposes fairly well of the bulk of civil litigations arising between parties in different municipal jurisdictions. The operation of the
criminal law irrespective of national boundaries and sectional interests,
however, should form one of the main points in the demand for diminished
national sovereignty. Formal inauguration of world criminal law is quite
feasible, 43 and a world criminal court could be established even for our
own world order. The technical difficulties which the creation of such a
procedure presents can be readily overcome. 44 For a number of "political
crimes" it would become the instance of final appeal, and it could eventually fulfil many of the functions for the world community which the Supreme Court fulfils for the United States. If it is seen more clearly, after
the general decrease of gubernaculum, that all judges are the agents of the
societas hominum as conceived by Cicero, and that they do not "belong"
to specific national states, there may be less opposition to plans for a world
tribunal.
A world criminal court can be widened into a world (supreme) court in a
world state. The latter tribunal may consist of two chambers, one dealing
with such criminal, and the other dealing with such civil, cases as are conceded to their jurisdiction in the court's statute. In a world of semisovereign states (the farthest goal which can conceivably be reached in our lifetime), the foregoing, as well as the establishment of a world police force
for the arrest of culprits and the enforcement of decisions of the world
court, would appear premature. But these questions are now under investigation, and, in any event, the "just war" in support of the BriandKellogg Pact would constitute the ultimate sanction and safety measure.
Several writers have suggested that in the growth of world government,
the nature and function of the League of Nations Assembly may likewise
43

Cf. Ehrlich, The Sociology of Law, 36 Harv. L. Rev.

44 Hocking, Man and the State 375-76

(1926).

r30 (r922).
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be altered or replaced. Eventually, it may be transformed into a world
legislature, which can pass laws, can impeach, and, if necessary, can issue
bills of attainder. The world legislature. could be organized along the lines
of the International Labor Assembly, national (i.e., then "provincial" or
"sectional") delegations being composed partly of government representatives (of the state, province, or section) and partly of delegates from the
two or more major political parties of the area. Or direct elections could
be held for determining the representatives in the world legislature. Even
a world-wide synchronization and general unification of the latter type
of elections need not be dismissed as wholly utopian. This may promote
the crystallization of public opinion for a world state and, ultimately, for
the creation of an executive for such a state. Itis doubtful, however, whether it will ever be expedient to go in any way beyond a world council in the
choice of a world state executive. In the growth of world political parties,
sectional differences rather than a "class structure" of world society are
more likely to appear as determinants. Whether the so-called world state
envisaged by these writers would represent, e.g., a union or a federation,
need not be discussed here.
Contemporary international law deals with sovereign nation-states,
and looks toward their unreformed preservation. The element of individual responsibility is extraneous to international law. Individual criminal
responsibility under world law is not only feasible, but its employment
may prove of great benefit in the promotion of a better world order.

